This paper investigates how firms determine the capital structure of a subsidiary that is divested in a spinoff. In a spin-off, the parent divides the assets of the firm and chooses the capital structure for the new, stand-alone entity. Unlike the firms in other capital structure studies, the subsidiary's leverage ratio is its initial capital structure. Thus, the typical explanations for why firms' leverage ratios may deviate from their target ratios do not apply. I therefore use this sample to investigate how firms determine their capital structure. I find that the subsidiary has a leverage ratio lower than the parent but similar to a comparable non-spin-off firm. Also, similar to other firms, the subsidiary's leverage is negatively related to growth and positively related to its collateral value. However, unlike other firms, leverage is not inversely related to profitability. Further, the difference between the subsidiaries' and comparable firms' leverage ratios is positively related to profitability. These results support the predictions of the trade off theory of capital structure and provide insight into why previous studies find a negative relation between leverage and profitability.
Introduction
Do firms have an optimal or target capital structure and, if so, do they lever the firm to coincide with this target? In this paper, I address this question by examining how firms choose their initial capital structure in a corporate spin-off. Spin-offs provide a unique setting to examine capital structure choice because one observes the initial capital structure of a mature firm. In a spin-off, a subsidiary is fully divested from a parent and becomes a stand-alone entity. Prior to this event, the subsidiary is unable to issue equity and relies on the parent to finance its capital investments. The subsidiary therefore has little if any debt and does not manage its capital structure. At the time of the divestiture, the firm divides the assets of the firm and chooses a capital structure for the new firm. Thus, the choice of leverage for the subsidiary is revealed.
Most of the previous analysis of capital structure examines firms' leverage ratios. Historical operating and financial decisions influence these ratios. For instance, a string of unexpectedly high (low) profits will push leverage below (above) the target leverage ratio. If firms continuously adjust their capital structure, they will immediately correct these deviations. However, if transaction costs or market conditions prevent quick movements back to the target, firms will at least temporarily deviate from their target leverage ratio. This temporary deviation may induce a negative relation between leverage and profit [Myers (1993) ]. Numerous capital structure papers document that leverage and profit are negatively correlated. If profits are correlated with growth opportunities that are not captured by other measures of growth, then this negative relation is consistent with the trade off theory. However, if growth does not induce the negative relation between profits and leverage, then the trade-off theory cannot explain this relation. 1 1 Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) examine debt and equity issues to determine if firms "correct" for the effects of prior operating profit. They find that firms move toward a target leverage ratio when they issue securities. Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989) further discuss the problems that result from using leverage ratios to investigate how firms determine their capital structure. They model the impact of the cost to adjust leverage and explain how empirical tests that use year-end debt ratios are biased since observed leverage ratios depend on past operations. Shyham-Sunder and Myers (1999) use simulations to investigate the impact of historical decisions on capital structure and show that the trade-off theory may appear to work because the serial correlation and cyclicality of earnings and capital expenditures induce mean reversion in firms' debt ratios. This mean reversion can be misinterpreted as reversion to a target ratio.
In this paper, I avoid the problems associated with using firms' leverage ratios by examining initial leverage ratios chosen for a sample of spun-off subsidiaries.
2 If firms choose an optimal leverage ratio, then firm characteristics will determine leverage choice. The relations between firm characteristics and leverage are more easily detectable in this sample because the leverage ratios do not evolve from prior operating histories but rather are chosen. This motivation is similar to Gilson's (1997) and Alderson and Betker's (1995) examinations of the role of transaction and liquidation costs in the leverage choice of firms emerging from financial distress. Gilson finds that high transaction costs lead firms to retain more debt.
I find that the average debt to value of the subsidiaries is significantly lower than that of their preand post-spin-off parents. The subsidiaries' and the pre-and post-spin-off parent's leverage ratios are higher than their industry; however, the subsidiaries' industry-adjusted leverage ratio is significantly lower than the parents' industry-adjusted ratio. Thus, the firm chooses a lower leverage ratio for the subsidiary. Next, I examine the firm characteristics that influence the leverage choice. I find that the subsidiaries have lower leverage ratios if they are small with high growth opportunities. However, when the subsidiaries are large and have higher collateral value, they have higher leverage ratios than their parents. These results indicate that firms make strategic capital structure decisions and imply that size, growth, and collateral value influence debt choice.
I further investigate how firms choose their leverage ratios by analyzing the relation between the subsidiaries' leverage ratios and several firm characteristics. This analysis is similar to the leverage regressions in other papers except that I limit the analysis to a sample of spun-off subsidiaries. I find that growth and collateral value significantly influence leverage choice. High growth firms choose lower leverage ratios and firms with high collateral value choose higher leverage ratios. These results are consistent with the findings of other studies and support the trade-off theory. However, profitability, which is strongly significant in other studies, does not influence the choice of debt. Thus, the factors that cause the negative relation do not influence the spun-off subsidiaries' capital structure decisions.
To further investigate potential differences in the factors influencing the spin-off firms' leverage choice and non-sample firms' leverage ratios, I compare the subsidiary's actual leverage ratio to a predicted leverage ratio. I calculate predicted leverage ratios by analyzing the relation between leverage and several firm characteristics for firms that did not participate in a spin-off and use these coefficients to calculate the predicted leverage ratios. 3 At both the mean and the median, the leverage ratio chosen for the subsidiaries is insignificantly different from their predicted leverage ratios. However, some firms have leverage ratios that are very different from their predicted ratios. Further, the previously discussed results show that the factors that determine the choice of leverage in a spin-off differ from those that influence non-sample firms' leverage ratios. I therefore investigate the difference in the factors influencing spun-off subsidiaries' and non-sample firms' leverage ratios by analyzing the relation between the differences in the actual and predicted leverage ratios and several firm characteristics. I find that differences in profitability strongly explain the leverage choice relative to predicted ratios. Relative leverage and profitability are positively related and the primary difference in the factors influencing the subsidiaries and non-sample firms' leverage ratios is the impact of profitability. These results imply that the previously documented negative relation between leverage and profit derives from distortions in firms' leverage ratios that occur over time rather than from a true economic choice.
I begin the paper in section 2 with a description of the sample and a discussion of corporate spinoffs. A description of how firms allocate debt in a spin-off follows in section 3. Section 3 also provides several summary statistics. In section 4, I examine the factors that influence leverage choice. I continue in section 5 by comparing the leverage ratios to a predicted leverage ratio and in section 6 with robustness analysis. I conclude the paper in section 7.
Sample Description
A spin-off is a pro-rata distribution of the stock of a subsidiary to existing shareholders. The subsidiary may be an existing division or a newly created subsidiary of the parent. At the time of the spin-off, the subsidiary becomes a freestanding company. No funds are raised in a spin-off and neither firm revalues its assets. Under Internal Revenue Code section 355, a spin-off is considered a tax-exempt distribution if after the spin-off the parent retains no more than a 20% interest in the voting power of all classes of voting stock and no more than a 20% interest in each class of non-voting stock. Additionally, the distribution may not be executed as a means of distributing dividends to the stockholders and both corporations must be engaged in active business after the spin-off and for five years preceding the spinoff. Due to the strong tax incentive, most spin-offs involve the near complete divestiture of the subsidiary. Thus, the parent allocates the assets and liabilities to a freestanding company. It is possible for firms to spin-off a subsidiary in two stages, where first a portion of the subsidiary is carved-out and then the rest of the shares are distributed tax-free to shareholders of the parent company. The characteristics of this sub-sample may differ from the rest of the sample because the subsidiary is publicly traded with access to equity markets before the spin-off and the inflow of cash from the carve-out may alter the capital structure. I therefore exclude 13 spin-offs in which a carve-out was filed prior to the effective date of the spin-off. Data on carve-out filings are obtained from Security Data
Corporation's New Issues database. The analysis presented in this paper relies on the 129 spin-offs for which all required data are available.
in which the parent and the subsidiary are in different industries. Since Compustat provides only historical SIC codes and due to the problems with CRSP SIC codes [Kahle and Walkling (1996) ], I obtain primary SIC codes from Dun and Bradstreet's Million Dollar Directory for the year following the spinoff. Using a 3-digit SIC code, 86% of the subsidiaries are in different industries than their parent's primary industry. Using a 2-digit SIC code, approximately 74% of the subsidiaries are in different industries than their parents.
Empirical research indicates that spinning off a subsidiary is a value-increasing event, particularly if the subsidiary is in an industry unrelated to the parent's industry. Hite and Owers (1983) , Miles and Rosenfeld (1983) , and Schipper and Smith (1983) document a 2 to 3% abnormal return at the announcement of a spin-off. 6 Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) and Schlingemann, Stulz and Walkling (2001) find that the gains from spin-offs are concentrated in firms engaging in spin-offs to separate diverse operating units. 7 Firms may also spin-off to facilitate a merger, improve the information available about the subsidiary [Habib, Johnsen, and Naik (1997) , Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (1997) , Wheatley, Brown, and Johnson (1997) and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) ], improve the incentives of division managers [Aron (1991) ], or improve the subsidiaries' access to external capital [Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) ]. The motive for spinning off that is most related to debt choice is that firms may spin-off to expropriate wealth from debtholders by allocating most of the debt to one of 5 The sample size concurs with those used in other spin-off papers over similar time periods such as Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (1998 ), McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001 ), and Wruck and Wruck (1999 . 6 Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) show that a portfolio of spun-off subsidiaries significantly outperforms a portfolio of size and industry matched firms over the 3 years following the event. Desai and Jain (1999) find that the abnormal performance is concentrated in spin-offs in which a firm divests an unrelated business. Cusatis et al. (1993) show that the abnormal return is limited to the 14% of the sample, which are subsequently merged or taken over. However, McConnell, Ozbilgin, and Wahal (2001) find that a trading strategy that involves buying spin-off parents and subsidiaries over the 1989 and 1995 period would not result in abnormal returns. 7 The gain to spin-offs may therefore result from reductions in the diversification discount. There is an extensive literature on the value of refocusing the firm and the diversification discount. Berger and Ofek (1995) , Lang and Stulz (1994), and Servaes (1996) document the diversification discount. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997 ), Hyland (2001 ), and Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000 examine why the diversification discount exists.
the entities. Parrino (1996) finds that this may have occurred in the 1992 Marriott spin-off, but Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and Smith (1983) find no evidence of widespread bondholder expropriation.
Summary Statistics

A. Leverage Ratios
Because a spin-off creates a stand-alone company that did not previously have a capital structure, the initial capital structure reveals the firms' choice of leverage. In this section, I discuss how leverage is allocated in a spin-off and present the leverage ratios chosen in a spin-off by comparing the subsidiaries'
and parents' leverage ratios and then compare the subsidiaries' leverage choice to two benchmarks: 1) the subsidiaries' industry leverage ratio, and 2) a predicted leverage ratio.
There are two primary ways in which firms allocate debt to the subsidiary and therefore determine its capital structure. The parent will either re-assign the debt to the subsidiary, as in the 1995 Table 2 shows the number of firms that either directly reallocate debt or pay a dividend to the parents. I obtain the information about debt allocation and fund transfers by reading 8-K, 10-K and 10-Q filings of the parent and subsidiary that detail the spin-off. Unfortunately, reporting of this information is inconsistent and data are available for only 90 spin-offs. Of these, 60% (56 firms) directly allocate debt and 32 firms have a transfer of funds because the subsidiary pays a dividend to the parent that is funded with debt and typically used to repay parent debt. These 2 categories are not mutually exclusive; of these firms 10 allocate debt and transfer funds by paying a dividend. Paying a dividend to the parents is not the only method used to upstream funds to the parent. The subsidiary may also repay intercompany debt. Like the dividend, the subsidiary will typically finance the repayment with new debt and the parent may use these proceeds to paydown existing debt. Nineteen firms in this sample repay intercompany debt, of which 2 also allocate debt and 4 also transfer funds by the subsidiary pay a dividend to the parent.
exist are on more recent debt issues (after 1992) and thus do not apply to the majority of debt for firms in this sample.
Panel B of Table 2 details the amount of debt that is allocated to the subsidiary and the amount of funds transferred. On average, those firms that allocate debt allocate 16% of the debt of the pre-spin-off firm. This is slightly less than the size of the average spin-off; the average firm spins off 24% of its assets and 23% of its market value. Alternatively, fund transfers are slightly larger than the average size of a spin-off; dividends paid to the parent for the purpose of repaying debt equal 30% of the pre-spin-off firm's debt and repayment of intercompany loans amount to 26% of the pre-spin-off debt. These intercompany loans are not included in the pre-spin-off firm's debt. In general, the subsidiaries' debt levels originate from debt re-assigned from the parent and debt issued for the purpose of up-streaming funds to the parent. In a few cases, the subsidiary has external financing prior to the spin-off. In these cases, the subsidiary will either retain the debt or the parent may contribute funds to retire a portion of this debt, as in the 1996 spin-off of NCR by AT&T.
Panel A of Table 3 presents subsidiary's and parent's pre-and post-spin-off leverage ratios. I measure leverage as the total debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) divided by either total assets or the market value of equity plus total debt. 9 All post-spin-off variables, including the market value, are measured at the first fiscal year end following the divestiture. Ideally, it would be interesting to examine the firms immediately following the divestiture and the separated firm prior to the divestiture.
Unfortunately, accounting data is not filed at the time of the spin-off and the back stated data on the separated firm can be unreliable. Market data is available at the time of the spin-off and I repeat all analysis using the market value on the first day the firms trade separately. The results in this paper are robust to this alternative specification. Obviously, the amount of time that separates the most recent financial statement and the date of the spin-off will differ between firms. To determine if the results are sensitive to this time differential, I recalculate all statistics and reestimate all analysis using the subsample 9 I also investigate if one time accounting charges writedowns impact the leverage ratios by adjusting the book value of assets of the parent by discontinued operations charges and extraordinary or special items. Eighty-three have non-recurring charges, though these may or may not be related to the spin-off. I also adjust both the parents' and the subsidiaries' assets by backing out any charges due to accounting changes. Only 10 firms have accounting changes.
of firms where no more than 6 months elapse between the statements and the spin-off. The results are qualitatively unchanged. The last column in Table 3 Panel A presents p-values from tests for significant differences between the parents' and subsidiaries' ratios using both t-tests for means and a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for medians.
The subsidiaries' mean and median total debt to book value and total debt to market value ratios are significantly lower the parents' ratios. The subsidiaries have a median debt to book value of 0.23, where as the parents have a median ratio of 0.30 before and after the spin-off. These differences remain after adjusting for the median leverage ratio of firms with the same 3-digit SIC code (firm leverage ratio minus the median industry leverage ratio). Though not shown here, the pre-and post-spin-off parents' leverage ratios are not significantly different, both the mean and the median book leverage ratio is 0.34.
This similarity is not surprising since, as we will see in Table 6 , the parent does not dramatically change due to the spin-off; i.e. the spin-off does not alter many of the parents' characteristics. Thus, much of the analysis in this paper will focus on the leverage ratio chosen for the subsidiary.
The parents' pre-and post-spin-off and the subsidiaries' industry adjusted leverage ratios are significantly greater than zero at the 1% level. This difference indicates that factors other than industry determine leverage choice and that parents may pass on excess debt to the subsidiary. Later in this paper, I will investigate how the leverage ratios compare to firms with similar characteristics other than industry
and further investigate what factors influence leverage choice. The subsidiaries also have lower total debt to market value ratios and interest coverage ratios than the parents, though these differences are not always significant.
According to the diversification literature, there is a potential coinsurance benefit to diversification that may allow diversified firms to have higher debt ratios because the subsidiaries have imperfectly correlated cash flows that reduce the cost of debt. One predictions that comes out of this is After these adjustments, the leverage ratios are not significantly different to those presented in Table 3 and all results presented in this paper are qualitatively unchanged if the adjusted leverage ratios are used in the analysis.
that when firms spin-off an unrelated subsidiary, total debt should fall by more than when they spin-off a related subsidiary. To test this, I investigate whether the change in total debt significantly differs for the sub-sample where the parent and the subsidiary are in the same versus different 2-digit SIC codes. Panel B of Table 3 presents the debt ratios for these two sub-sample and shows that the median firm that divests a subsidiary in a different industry experiences an insignificant decrease in its book and market debt ratios whereas the firms divesting a related subsidiary experience a significant increase in the book debt ratio and no change to the market debt ratio. The decrease experienced by the unrelated divesters is consistent with the predictions of coinsurance hypothesis but since the difference is insignificant the evidence is inconclusive. Additionally, it is unclear why the related divesters increase their book leverage ratios.
In addition to examining total debt ratios, I also investigate the types of debt of each firm in the spin-off. These data are from Compustat and from the notes of the financial statements and are detailed in Panel C of Table 3 . The first five categories are from Compustat and are presented as a percentage of long-term debt (not including current portions). The last five categories are from the notes of the financial statements and are presented as a percentage of total debt (including current portions). The categories from Compustat are self-explanatory; except for "other" with is a catch all for non-classified debt or revolvers. The categories from the notes of the financial statements require more subjective judgments. I classify any debt as bank debt if it is a revolver or if the notes specify it as bank debt. I also make another category that also includes variable rate debt as bank debt since most variable rate debt is non-public. Secured debt is any debt listed as secured or that details collateral assigned to it. Secured debt may or may not be bank debt. Any firm not listing bank, variable rate, or secured debt is assumed to have none. I also examine the maturity of the debt where data is available.
The results show that the subsidiary has less convertible and subordinated debt. It also has more "other" debt. The most striking result from this analysis is that subsidiaries have significantly more bank debt than either the pre-or post-spin-off parents. On average, 35% of the subsidiaries' debt is bank debt.
A large portion of this is revolvers, which also explains why the subsidiaries have more "other" debt.
These revolvers are typically drawn on to pay the parent a dividend used to pay down parent debt or to repay intercompany indebtedness.
Panel D of Table 3 details the types of debt with the sample broken into those that allocate debt (56 firms) and for those that transfer funds by the subsidiary paying a dividend but do not allocate debt (22 firms). Recall from Table 2 that these are not mutually exclusive groups. I then test to see if the proportions of debt for these subgroups differ from the rest of the sample. The first section details the debt breakdown for firms that allocate debt and provides insight into if some forms of debt are more easily or more likely to be allocated. The subsidiary has a significantly greater proportion of secured debt if debt is allocated in the spin-off. This result is not surprising since debt will likely follow the assets pledged to it. Besides, secured debt being more likely allocated, there is little evidence that one debt type is more likely to be allocated since the percentage of bank debt held by the subsidiaries does not differ between those firms that do and do not allocate debt. The parents that allocate debt have less subordinated and more notes before and after the spin-off. The second section of Table 3 Panel D details the debt breakdown for firms that do not allocate debt and where the subsidiary pays a dividend to the parent and shows how the subsidiary funds this dividend and what debt the parent pays down with the proceeds. These statistics show that the average subsidiary that pays a dividend to the parent has 45% of its debt as bank debt and 53% as either bank or variable rate debt. This amount of bank debt is significantly more than the rest of the sample. The post spin-off parents that receive this dividend have significantly fewer notes than the rest of the sample. These results are consistent with the subsidiary funding the dividend with bank debt and the parent using these funds to repay notes. The pre-and postspin-off parents also have less debt that matures in five years and more debentures.
In Panel A of Table 3 , I show that the parents' and subsidiaries' leverage ratios differ significantly, which implies that firms make systematic capital structure decisions when they allocate debt in a spin-off. However, it remains unclear if the ratio chosen is the firm's target leverage ratio. To investigate if the leverage ratio chosen is the firm's target leverage ratio, I compare the firm's leverage to two metrics. First, I investigate if the leverage ratio significantly changes over time. If the initial leverage ratio is the firm's target, then assuming a stable target, the firm's leverage ratio should not change. In Table 4 , I examine the subsidiaries' and parents' leverage ratios 1, 2, and 3 years after the spin-off and test if these ratios differ from the firm's initial leverage ratio using both t-tests for means and
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests. Although the subsidiaries' and parents' median book leverage ratio the year after the spin-off is significantly different from its initial leverage ratio, overall the firm does not significantly alter its capital structure. Thus, the firm chooses its leverage for at least three years when it determines its initial leverage ratio.
The second measure I employ is a predicted total debt to book leverage ratio computed using methods similar to Berger, Ofek, and Yermack (1997) . Using a pooled cross-section of all non-sample firms on Compustat for the 1983 to 1995 period, I regress firms' leverage ratios on several contemporaneous variables that other studies show significantly influence leverage ratios: size as measured by the natural logarithm of assets, R&D to sales, market to book ratio (market value of equity plus total debt divided by total assets), profitability based on operating income before depreciation divided by assets, 10 collateral value (inventory plus PP&E) to total assets, a trichotomous estimate of the firms' marginal tax rates discussed in Graham (1996a) , and median industry 5-year annual earnings volatility, where earnings is measured by operating income before depreciation. I use industry rather than firm specific earnings volatility because a time-series of earnings is not available for the subsidiary. I also include year and two-digit SIC code dummy variables. I then use the coefficients from this regression to estimate the expected leverage ratio of the pre-spin-off firms, the parents, and the subsidiaries. Table 5 presents summary statistics of how actual leverage ratios compare with predicted leverage ratios for the pre-spin-off firms and post-spin-off parents and subsidiaries. At the margin, the subsidiaries' actual leverage ratios are not significantly different from their expected leverage ratios.
Thus, the leverage ratio chosen for the subsidiary in a spin-off is similar to that of a comparable firm.
Further, the pre-spin-off firms' leverage ratios do not differ significantly from their expected leverage ratios, indicating that firms that decide to spin-off do not have significantly different leverage ratios from those that do not spin-off. Conversely, the mean of the difference between the post-spin-off parents' actual and predicted book and market leverage ratios are significantly greater than zero. However, the difference is insignificant at the median. These results imply that there is no systematic misallocation of debt in a corporate spin-off and implies that firms choose leverage ratios close to a target leverage ratio.
The conclusions drawn from the predicted ratios contradict those that may be inferred from the industry comparisons in Panel A of Table 3 . Panel A shows that the pre-and post-spin-off parent and subsidiary all have leverage ratios greater than their industries. However, Table 5 shows that these firms have leverage ratios much closer to their predicted leverage ratio. Obviously, the predicted leverage ratios must be much greater than the industry ratios. To investigate why this difference occurs, I compare each variable used to predict the predicted leverage ratio to its industry median to see how these firms differ from those in their industry. I find a few differences (not reported here) but by far the most dramatic is that the sample firms are much larger than the median firm in their industry. The mean (median) firms in the pre-spin-off parent's, post-spin-off parent's and subsidiary's industries have total assets of 1,078 (101), 1,516 (118) and 270 (52), respectively. As shown in Table 6 , the pre-spin-off parents, post-spin-off parents and subsidiaries in this sample have mean (median) total assets of 7,089
(1,209), 6,947 (908), and 1,506 (251), respectively. Each of these measures differ significantly from their industry means and medians. Since size and leverage of positively related in the analysis used to generate the predicted ratios (and as shown in several capital structure studies), the predicted leverage ratio for the sample will be much greater than the average of the industry leverage ratios. Thus, the predicted leverage ratios are more likely closer to the firm's optimal leverage than the industry because the predicted ratios reflect the lower bankruptcy costs and thus lower cost of debt characteristic of larger firms.
B. Firm characteristics
The previous analysis illustrates that the subsidiaries' leverage ratios are significantly different than the parents' ratios; thus, firms make strategic capital structure decisions in a spin-off. This hypothesis holds if the parent and subsidiary differ in ways that would cause the subsidiary to prefer a lower leverage ratio. I therefore examine several firm characteristics that other papers have shown to be significantly related to leverage to investigate the difference in the parents and the subsidiaries that may lead to this debt choice. Panel A of Table 6 presents these summary statistics. All pre-spin-off variables, including market value, are measured as of the last fiscal year end prior to the spin-off. All post-spin-off variables, including market value, are measured as of the first fiscal year end following the spin-off. All tests of significant differences are done using both t-tests for means and a Wilcoxon, matched-pairs ranked-sum test.
The statistics in Panel A of Table 6 illustrate that the subsidiary is significantly smaller than the parent. On average, these firms allocate almost 25% of their assets and market value to the subsidiaries, measured as the value of the subsidiary at the first fiscal year end following the event divided by the sum of the value of the subsidiary and parent at the first fiscal year end following the event.
11 The subsidiary has a median book value of $251 million and a median market value of equity $95 million, compared to the parent's median book value of $908 million and median market value of equity of $609 million. The relative size of the subsidiary may make the choice of the subsidiary's leverage even less constrained since the parent can potentially set the subsidiary's capital structure without significantly altering it own leverage. As mentioned earlier, undocumented tests show that on average the parent's leverage ratio does not change between the pre-and post-spin-off periods.
The subsidiaries also have significantly higher growth opportunities, as measured by research and development expense to sales and significantly higher collateral value (property, plant and equipment and inventory to total assets). These results are surprising because one does not expect high growth firms to have high collateral value. Further investigations reveal that the subsidiaries with high growth are typically not the ones with high collateral value. 12 The subsidiaries also have lower market to book ratios, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, which implies that the subsidiaries have fewer growth opportunities than the parent. However, the subsidiaries' market to book ratio is very volatile with ratios as high as 8.7 and as low as 0.03. Thus, it is difficult to generalize about the subsidiaries growth opportunities based on this ratio. This volatility may account for the contradiction between the implications of the market to book and R&D to sales ratios.
There are several other differences between the parent and the subsidiary. Subsidiaries operate in industries that have greater five-year industry earnings volatility. I measure earnings volatility as the standard deviation of a firm's annual percentage change in operating income before depreciation. I use industry medians rather than firm-specific volatility since a time-series of earnings is not available for the subsidiary. The subsidiaries also have significantly lower marginal tax rates. I use two estimates of the tax rate. First, I use a trichotomous estimate of the tax rate equal to i) the top statutory tax rate if taxable income is positive and the firm has no NOLs; ii) one-half the top rate if either taxable income is positive or the firm has NOLs, or iii) zero otherwise.
13 Graham (1996b) shows that the trichotomous variable is better than most proxies of a firm's tax status and is second only to an estimate of the marginal tax rate, such as the one presented in Graham (1996a). Graham's estimates of the marginal tax rate are superior to most tax variables because most tax proxies incorporate taxable income, which is reduced by interest expense. Thus, an endogenous relation may exist between leverage and taxes. I therefore also include the firm's simulated marginal tax rate corrected for potential endogeneity problems, as computed by Graham (1996) and Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) . 14 Unfortunately, extensive data are required to 12 In Panel B, I further describe these two sets of subsidiaries. 13 The top rate is 46% through 1986 46% through , 39.5% in 1987 46% through , 34% from 1988 46% through through 1992 46% through , and 35% starting in 1993 46% through [Graham (1996b ]. 14 I would like to thank John Graham for making these rates available.
estimate the simulated tax rate and much of these data are not available for many subsidiaries in the year of the spin-off.
The subsidiary's return on assets ratio (ROA) is significantly lower than the parent's ROA. I measure this return as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets as of the first fiscal year end following the spin-off. Thus, ROA excludes the effects of taxes, depreciation, and interest to prevent an endogenous relation between leverage and profits. ROA also excludes extraordinary items and special items resulting from non-recurring events. 15 Some of the restructuring charges associated with a spin-off are contained in special items, thus it is important to exclude these charges. Using this measure, the subsidiaries' mean (median) ROA is 0.07 (0.12), which is significantly lower than the parent's mean and median ROA of 0.14. 16 Using operating income that excludes special items removes some but not all of the biases that may result from the restructuring surrounding the spin-off. Firms may also experience "above the line" charges if they make accounting changes in conjunction with the spin-off. Since the subsidiary is becoming a freestanding company that substantially differs from the parent, it is likely that it may choose alternative accounting methods. I therefore investigate the cumulative effect on earnings of these accounting changes and find that 10 subsidiaries report an accounting change. If I restate these 10 firms' ROA backing out the effect of the accounting change, neither the mean nor the median ROA changes.
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The summary statistics in Panel A provide mixed predictions for firms' target leverage ratios.
According to the trade-off theory, firms weigh the costs and benefit of debt to determine a target leverage ratio. One of the primary benefits of debt results from the tax-deductibility of interest expense. 18 Firms with higher marginal tax rates have a higher target leverage ratios. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) , Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) , Graham (1996a and 1996b ), and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997 provide empirical support for this prediction. Growth may also influence the choice of capital structure.
Titman and Wessels (1988), Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1993) , and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1996) document a negative relation between leverage and research and development expense, which may measure growth opportunities. Kim and Sorensen (1986) document a negative relation between earnings growth and leverage and Rajan and Zingales (1995) show that market to book is negatively related to leverage in all of the G-7 countries. These results are consistent with Myers' (1977) trade-off theory, in which high levels of debt increase the probability that the firm will under-invest and decrease the value of growth opportunities. 19 High leverage may also increase the probability of bankruptcy; thus, the greater the probability of bankruptcy, the lower a firm's target leverage ratio. 20 More volatile firms may have a greater probability of bankruptcy [Titman and Wessels (1988) ] and therefore a lower target leverage ratio.
Based on these predictions, a subsidiary should have a lower target leverage ratio than its parent because it has higher research and development expenses, a lower tax rate, and is in a more volatile industry.
The subsidiaries, however, also have higher collateral value and lower profitability. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and Pulvino (1998) explain that bankruptcy costs are also higher if a large fraction of assets are not easy to liquidate. Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) show that collateral value of assets is positively related to leverage. The subsidiaries' collateral values imply higher target leverage ratios than their parents. Additionally, several researchers find a strong inverse relation between leverage and profitability [Titman and Wessels (1988) , Rajan and Zingales (1995), Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) ]. The source of this inverse relation is widely debated. If profits are correlated with growth, then the inverse relation may be further evidence of the negative relation between growth and leverage. Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) show that firms with greater profits issue equity;
however, this relation becomes insignificant once the authors control for growth with q. However, Rajan and Zingales (1995) include both profits and market to book in their analysis and find that leverage remains inversely related to profits for US firms. Based on this relation, subsidiaries will have significantly higher leverage than the parents. If, however, the inverse relation between profits and leverage does not derive from growth, then the relation is inconsistent with the trade-off theory.
According to the trade-off theory, more profitable firms have more income to shield from taxes and should have more not less debt. Thus, lower profits would lead the subsidiary to have a lower leverage ratio.
The summary statistics in Panel A provide conflicting predictions for the subsidiaries' target leverage ratio. It is therefore unclear if the subsidiaries should have a leverage ratio greater than or less than the parents. I therefore divide the sample to separately examine the subsidiaries with leverage ratios that are higher and lower than their parents. Specifically, I calculate the difference in the subsidiary's and parent's post-spin-off total book leverage ratios. I then divide the sample into quartiles based on these ratios. Panel B of Table 6 provides summary statistics for the first and fourth quartiles, where the subsidiaries have significantly lower and significantly higher leverage ratios than the parent, respectively.
These statistics indicate that the subsidiaries have lower leverage ratios than the parents when they have significantly more growth opportunities, as measured by R&D. Alternatively, the subsidiaries have higher leverage ratios when they have significantly more collateral value. These statistics highlight the importance of growth and collateral value in determining capital structure. In both groups, the subsidiaries are significantly smaller with lower profit than the parents; however, the lower leverage subsidiaries are smaller relative to the higher leverage subsidiaries. In the following section, I further investigate how these firm characteristics influence debt choice.
includes the indirect costs of bankruptcy and estimates that the total bankruptcy cost is 12% of the firms' value three years prior to bankruptcy. ( 1) where t is the year of the spin-off, s is the post-spin-off subsidiary, and value is defined as either the book value of assets or the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt. I assume that any firm that does not report R&D expense has no R&D expense and replace missing values with zero. Table 7 presents the results of estimating the Model (1) using the book leverage ratio as the dependent variable. 21 The results show that growth, as measured by the ratio of R&D to Sales, and the collateral value of assets, as measured by the ratio of inventory and PP&E to assets, significantly influence the choice of debt. A one standard deviation increase in growth results in a 20% decrease in the book leverage ratio chosen by the subsidiary. A one standard deviation increase in relative collateral value of assets results in an 8% increase in the book leverage ratio chosen by the subsidiary. Thus, these variables are both statistically and economically significant. The market to book ratio is insignificant.
Factors Influencing Leverage Choice
This result is surprising given the significance of R&D/Sales and the results of other studies. The insignificance of the coefficient on market to book may be due to the volatility of the ratio discussed in the previous section or the subsidiaries' market to book ratios may not accurately account for the firms' growth opportunities. Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993) and Desai and Jain (1999) show that a portfolio of spun-off subsidiaries significantly outperforms a portfolio of size and industry matched firms 21 A number of variables are not available for all firms, as seen in Table 6 and the univariate analysis. The missing variables result in 19 firms lost in the multivariate estimation of the model, column 8.
over the 3 years following the event. Thus, the market value shortly after the spin-off may not fully reflect firm value or growth opportunities. I therefore also include an alternative measure of growth, the median sales growth for firms in the same 3-digit SIC code for the 3-years prior to the spin-off (results not presented here). When this measure is included, it is negative and significant and the results presented in Table 5 are materially unchanged.
For comparison, I re-estimate the book leverage Model (1) using all firms on Compustat between 1983 and 1995 that did not do a spin-off. The sign and magnitude of the coefficient on R&D and the coefficient on Inventory and PP&E are similar to those presented in this study. However, as found in previous studies, the other variables are significant as well.
Other factors such as taxes, profitability and volatility do not influence the subsidiaries' leverage choice. The insignificance of the tax rate in this study is troubling since taxes are often considered the primary benefit of debt. However, the results may be biased because the trichotomous estimate of tax rates does not correct for the potential endogeneity problem or because of other biases due to mismeasurement of the tax rates [Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998) and Plesko (1999) ]. I therefore replace the trichotomous variable with an estimate of the marginal tax rate from Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim (1998), which corrects for the endogeneity. These results are not presented in the paper and provide no additional support for the influence of taxes on leverage choice. However, since estimates of the tax rate are only available for approximately one-half the sample and may continue to have biases, I conclude that the model may not adequately capture the influence of taxes.
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The insignificance of profitability in this analysis represents a major difference in the factors influencing initial and existing leverage ratios. In the non-sample estimation, the coefficient on profitability is -0.39 with a standard error of 0.004, indicating that profitability is both statistically and economically significant. 23 A one standard deviation increase in the non-sample firms' return on assets results in a 20% decrease in the book leverage ratio. This relation remains when market to book or industry sales growth is used to control for growth opportunities. Some researchers posit that the inverse relation between leverage and profit exists because profitable (unprofitable) firms work down to a low (high) leverage ratio by retaining earnings (issuing debt to fund deficits). The findings in this paper are consistent with this interpretation since the firms in this sample are choosing initial leverage ratios rather than managing capital structure over time. Thus, the inverse relation resulting from historical performance would not have time to evolve. Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) show that 54% of firms leverage ratios can be explained by industry. Thus, it is likely that the firm considers industry effects when it chooses leverage. I therefore include the median leverage ratio for firms in the same 3-digit SIC code in the analysis. The coefficient on the industry leverage is positive and significant. However, the results discussed above are robust to controlling for industry leverage ratios. Thus, the industry ratio may serve as a base but other factors also influence leverage choice.
The above analysis examines the initial choice of debt in a spin-off because it is an instance in which firms choose their capital structure. This choice, however, is not without constraints. Specifically, if a firm divides the debt of the pre-spin-off firm and neither firm issues or repays debt, then there is a limit on the amount of debt that is available for allocation. I therefore examine how the leverage ratio of the pre-spin-off firm impacts the leverage choice in a spin-off. I present these results in the last column of Table 7 . Not surprisingly, subsidiaries have higher leverage ratios if the pre-spin-off firm has more debt to allocate, indicating the leverage choice is not totally free of constraints. Since both the pre-and postspin-off firms have leverage ratios greater than their industry, the significance of the pre-spin-off leverage may indicate that parents pass excess leverage onto subsidiaries. However, it is unlikely that the firms are misallocating or over-levering the subsidiaries since the subsidiaries leverage ratio is not significantly different from its predicted leverage ratio. In section 5, I further investigate how the pre-spin-off leverage impacts the subsidiaries' leverage ratio and the potential for misallocation.
Further constraints occur because the pre-spin-off firm chooses the leverage for both the subsidiary and the post-spin-off parent. Thus, the firm jointly considers the characteristics of both firms.
I therefore estimate the relation between the differences in the subsidiaries' and pre-spin-off parents' leverage ratios and the differences in firms' characteristics. These results are not presented in this paper but are consistent with those in Table 7 showing that the difference in the subsidiaries growth and collateral value explain their difference in ratios. Similar to the levels regressions, no other variable significantly influences the leverage choice.
The previous analysis uses book leverage ratios. I also repeat this analysis using the market rather than the book leverage ratio. to sales results in a 22% decrease in the market leverage ratio chosen by the subsidiary and a one standard deviation increase in collateral value of assets results in an 8% increase in the market leverage ratio chosen by the subsidiary. However, the coefficient on collateral value becomes insignificant once I control for pre-spin-off and industry leverage. Another difference in the market leverage ratio analysis is that the market to book ratio is negative and significant, further supporting the importance of growth opportunities. The fact that growth is more significant in the market leverage ratio analysis is not surprising since the market leverage ratios better capture growth opportunities [Myers (1977) ].
Predicted Leverage Ratios
The results of the previous section indicate that the factors influencing non-spin-off firms' leverage ratios differ from the factors influencing the subsidiaries' leverage ratios. The subsidiaries' a coefficient on profit of -0.41.
leverage ratios are negatively related to growth opportunities and positively related to collateral values.
Conversely, growth, collateral value, and other firm characteristics influence non-sample firms' leverage ratios. Most importantly, non-sample firms' leverage ratios are negatively related to profitability. These differences raise the question, do subsidiaries leverage ratios differ from non-spin-off firms' leverage ratios and if they do, why? To investigate the difference in the subsidiaries' and comparable firms' leverage ratios, I compare the subsidiaries' actual and predicted leverage ratios in 
where t is the year of the spin-off, s is the post-spin-off subsidiary, E indicates the predicted leverage ratio and value is the book value of assets. These variables are the same as those used in Model 1 and in the estimation of the predicted ratio. Thus, the coefficients represent difference in the subsidiaries' and other firms' sensitivity to these factors.
The results, presented in Table 9 , are striking and illustrate the difference in the factors influencing non-sample firms' leverage ratios and the choice of initial leverage in a spin-off. Relative leverage ratios are positively related to profits. This finding contrasts with the results in other studies that show a negative relation between leverage and profit and further indicates that the inverse relation between leverage and profitability occurs only in non-sample firms that have operating histories. The result continues to hold when market to book ratios are used to control for growth opportunities, indicating that the difference in the relation does not stem from the correlation between growth and profit.
This result implies that the negative relation between leverage and profits derives from the influence of operating histories have on the leverage ratios. The coefficients on all other firm characteristics are insignificant, indicating that their influence on the subsidiaries' leverage ratios is not significantly different than their influence for all firms.
In section 4, I discussed the possibility that pre-spin-off firms may pass excess debt onto the subsidiary since both the pre-and post-spin-off firms have leverage greater than their industry. However, the summary statistics in Table 6 showed that, on average, neither the pre-or post-spin-off firms have leverage ratios significantly different from their predicted leverage ratio; thus, it is unlikely that the firms misallocate debt. In Table 9 , I show that the difference in the subsidiaries' actual and predicted leverage ratios is not explained by the pre-spin-off leverage ratios. Thus, the pre-spin-off firm's leverage ratio does not lead to any systematic misallocation of debt. To further examine this possibility, I replace the pre-spin-off leverage in model 2 with the difference in the pre-spin-off firm's actual and predicted leverage ratios. The coefficient on this difference is insignificant and the results are unchanged.
Alternatively, the coefficient on the industry leverage ratio is positive and significant in the analysis presented in Table 7 , indicating that industry effects influence subsidiaries' leverage ratios more than they influence comparable firms' leverage ratios.
Robustness
A. Further Examination of Profitability.
Weisbach (1995) shows that new management often manipulates earnings early. Management may do this through accounting changes, like those discussed earlier in this paper, or with real decisions that generate losses. I therefore investigate the potential biases in the profits measure by comparing ROA in the year of the spin-off to ROA in the following 3 years. As shown in Panel A of Table 6 , the subsidiaries' median ROA in the year of the spin-off is 0.12. The median ROAs in the 3 subsequent years are 0.13, 0.13, and 0.12, in chronological order. Using Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test, none of these subsequent ratios are significantly different from the ratio in the year of the spin-off. Thus, the initial ROA is representative of the firm's future profitability. Next, I use the ROA one year after the first fiscal year end as the measure of profits and re-estimate Model 1. These results are not presented but show that in both the univariate and multivariate analysis, ROA is positive and significant. This result further illustrates that, unlike non-sample firms, the subsidiary's leverage is not negatively related to profits.
Another potential problem with the ROA variable is that there are potential outliers in the subsidiaries' ROA. I therefore Winsorize all variables at the 5% and 95% level, i.e. I set all firms' ROA that are less than the fifth percentile equal to the fifth percentile ROA. I then re-estimate Model 1 and find that the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 7 . The coefficient on R&D to
Sales is negative and significant, the coefficient on collateral value is positive and significant, and the coefficients on all other variables including ROA are insignificant.
The insignificance of the coefficient on ROA in this analysis contradicts the findings of other studies. However, the coefficient on ROA in the multivariate analysis is negative. It is possible that the insignificance may be due to a small sample size and / or variance in ROA; thus, the model is unable to estimate the coefficient precisely. To investigate this possibility, I first run Model 1 on the sample of post spin-off parents, since this sample is of the same size. The coefficient on ROA in this analysis is negative and significant. Thus, sample size does not cause imprecision. However, the subsidiaries' ROA is much more volatile than the parents' ROA. To further investigate the precision of the estimate, I perform simulations of the univariate and multivariate analysis presented in Table 5 . To simulate a sample similar to the subsidiaries, I use the subsidiaries' explanatory variables but generate leverage ratios that force the negative relation between leverage and profits. Specifically, leverage is equal to ROA times the coefficient on ROA from the non-sample regressions (-0.39) plus a random ε, where ε is mean zero with a variance such that the simulated leverage has a standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of the subsidiaries' book leverage ratio. I run the simulation 1,000 times. In all 1,000 cases, the coefficient on ROA is negative and significant at the 1% level. Thus, a sample of this size and variability is able to precisely estimate the coefficient.
B. Debtholder Expropriation
Parrino (1996) shows that in the 1992 Marriott spin-off the firm allocated its debt to its poorer performing assets. In section 5, I illustrate that the subsidiaries have leverage greater than predicted when they have higher ROA. Thus, it is unlikely that these firms are expropriating wealth from the debt holders.
In this section, however, I further investigate whether the expropriation of bondholder wealth occurs in this sample of spin-offs. I do this in two ways. First, I examine abnormal bond returns for the pre-spinoff firms in the month of the spin-off announcement. 24 I calculate an expected return for the month of the spin-off for each bond issue of the pre-spin-off firm using the market model, where the 24 months ending 3 months before the spin-off announcement comprise the estimation period and the Lehman Brothers Corporate Bond Index is used as the market. I compare the expected return with the actual return, adjusted for accrued interest. All abnormal returns are computed for the month of the spin-off unless the spin-off occurs in the first or last two trading days of the month. When the spin-off occurs in the last two trading days of the month, I calculate the two-month return for the month of the spin-off and the subsequent month to ensure that I capture any change due to the spin-off announcement. If the spinoff announcement occurs in the first two trading days of the month, I calculate the two-month return for the month of the spin-off and the previous month. I transform the two-month actual and expected returns into one-month returns by taking the square root of one plus the return and then subtracting one. The abnormal return for each firm is the median return of all of the firm's bonds. There are 63 bond issues by 19 companies that have the data needed to calculate abnormal returns.
The mean and median bond returns are listed in Panel A of Table 10 . Neither the mean nor the median abnormal return is significantly different from zero. This result indicates that, on average, firms do not expropriate wealth from the debtholders in spin-offs. This finding concurs with the findings of Schipper and Smith (1983) and Hite and Owers (1983) , who examine bond returns around spin-off announcements that occur in the 1970s and early 1980s, and Wruck and Wruck (1999) , who examine the impact of manager succession on the allocation of assets and liabilities in a corporate spin-off.
Due to the lack of available bond price data and the need for a time series of prices to calculate an abnormal return, the abnormal returns data are available for only 16 spin-offs. I therefore also analyze the change in the firms' bond ratings for the 61 firms that are rated by S&P, Moody's, or Finch. 25 These results are reported in Panel B of Table 10 . Since bond ratings do not respond quickly, I look for a change in ratings between either one-month before the spin-off announcement and one month after the date the spin-off occurs or one month before the spin-off announcement and one year after the date the spin-off occurs. I find that only three firms experience a decrease in bond ratings by one month after the spin-off and only six by one year after the spin-off. Alternatively, 8 firms experience an increase in ratings during these time periods. I therefore conclude that firms do not allocate debt to expropriate wealth from bondholders in these spin-offs.
Conclusion
Despite extensive investigations into how firms determine their capital structures, the capital structure puzzle prevails. One of the difficulties researchers face in these studies is that a firm may deviate from its target leverage ratio. These deviations arise because operating and financial decisions push leverage above or below the firm's target and transaction costs and market conditions may prevent immediate corrections. Empirical studies using year-end debt ratios firms therefore distort the impact of the factors influencing leverage choice. This study avoids these problems by investigating the capital structure of a divested subsidiary in a spin-off. In a spin-off, the firm allocates assets and chooses a capital structure for the newly formed, stand-alone subsidiary. Prior to this event, the subsidiary exists but does not have an individual capital structure. Thus, the leverage ratio in this paper is the initial leverage for the firm.
I find that firms make systematic leverage choices and allocate debt based on firm characteristics.
These results support the predictions of the trade-off theory. Specifically, growth is negatively and collateral value is positively related to leverage choice. Further, profitability is not inversely related to leverage choice and is positively related to the difference in a firm's actual and predicted leverage ratio.
This finding contrasts with many other capital structure studies that find a negative relation between profit and non-sample firms' leverage ratios. This negative relation is typically attributed either to growth or to factors that cause a firm to deviate from its target capital structure. Once growth is controlled for, any negative relation that remains between leverage and profits contradicts the trade-off theory. Conversely, the results in this paper are consistent with the predictions of the trade-off theory and indicate that firms weigh the costs and benefits of debt when they make capital structure decisions.
This paper focuses on the initial leverage choice in a corporate spin-off and these leverage ratios compare to non-sample firms. The primary goal of this paper is to better understand those factors previously documented to influence leverage. This paper does not attempt to explain how historical operating and financing decisions impact the leverage ratio. Rather, I limit the analysis to the firm's initial capital structure to provide a cleaner test of how firms choose their capital structure.
Understanding how firms manage their leverage ratio over time is an important and interesting question, but is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 3 Leverage Ratios for Parents and Subsidiaries
This table presents mean (median) leverage ratios. The total book leverage ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets. The total market leverage ratio is total debt divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. Industry adjustments are made by subtracting the median leverage ratio for all firms in the same 3 digit SIC code from the firm's leverage ratio. The interest coverage ratio is interest expense divided by operating income before depreciation. Panel A presents the leverage ratios the year prior to the spin-off and the first fiscal year end following the spin-off. Panel B presents the debt ratios for firms that spin-off a subsidiary in either the same or different 2 digit SIC code. Panels C and D presents the breakdown of debt as a percentage of total or long-term debt. Panel C presents the entire sample and Panel D breaks the sample into groups based on the method of debt allocation or funds transferred specified in Table 2 . The last column of Panels A and C indicates the p-value from t-tests (means) and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (medians) of differences between the parent and subsidiary in the year of the spin-off. The last column of Panel B indicates the p-value from t-tests (means) and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test (medians) of differences between the pre-and post-spin-off parents. In Panel D, ***, **, and * indicate that the mean or median of the sub-group's ratio is significantly different from the rest of the sample at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using from t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test. The numbers of observations are in italics.
Panel A:
Pre This table presents mean (median) leverage ratios for the three years following the spin-off. The total book leverage ratio is total debt divided by book value of assets. The total market leverage ratio is total debt divided by the market value of equity plus the book value of debt. ***, **, and * indicate that the mean or median of the ratio is significantly different from the leverage in the year immediately following the spin-off (t=0) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using from t-tests and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test. Table 5 Predicted Leverage Ratios
This table details the mean (median) of the difference in firms' actual and predicted leverage ratios. Predicted leverage ratios are calculated using methods similar to Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) . Debt to book value or debt to market value for all firms except the sample firms for the 1983 to 1995 period is regressed on return on assets (operating income before depreciation divided by total assets, a trichotomous tax variable, collateral value (inventory and pp&e divided by total assets), ln assets, R & D to sales, median industry earnings volatility, year dummies, and two-digit SIC dummies. The trichotomous tax variable is equal to i) the top statutory tax rate if taxable income is positive and the firm has no NOLs; ii) onehalf the top rate if either taxable income is positive or the firm has the no NOLs, or iii) zero otherwise. Industry earnings volatility is the median of the industry's standard deviation of the annual percent change in operating income before depreciation over the five years prior to the spin-off. The coefficients from this regression are used to predict sample firms' predicted leverage ratios. ***, **, and * indicate the differences are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using t-tests (means) and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests (medians). 
Subsidiaries:
Difference in leverage = Actual -Predicted -0.01 0.00 (-0.03) (-0.03)
Table 6 Summary Statistics for Parents and Subsidiaries
This table presents the means (medians) of several firm characteristics for the pre-and post-spin-off firms. Panel A presents summary statistics for all firms. The market to book ratio is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets. The trichotomous tax variable is equal to i) the top statutory tax rate if taxable income is positive and the firm has no NOLs; ii) one-half the top rate if either taxable income is positive or the firm has NOLs, or iii) zero otherwise. Return on assets is operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Industry earnings volatility is the median of the industry's standard deviation of the annual % change in operating income before depreciation over the five years prior to the spin-off. % of assets spun off is determined by comparing the total assets of the subsidiary in the year of the spin-off to the sum of the parent's and subsidiary's(ies') assets in the year of the spinoff. The percentage of market value is similarly measured using the market value of equity the close of the fiscal year end. Panel B breaks the sample into quartiles by the difference in the parents' and subsidiaries total book leverage ratio. The first two columns present statistics for the highest quartile (i.e. parent leverage greater than subsidiary leverage) and the last two columns present statistics for the lowest quartile (i.e. parent leverage less than subsidiary leverage). The numbers of observations are in italics. ***, **, and * indicate significant differences between the parent and subsidiary at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using t-tests (means) and Wilcoxon matchedpairs signed-rank tests (medians). This table summarizes the results from estimating the relation between the subsidiaries' book leverage ratios and the variables defined in Table 6 . P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated using White's correction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Table 9 Analysis of Differences in Subsidiaries' Actual and Predicted Leverage Ratios
This table summarizes the results from estimating the relation between the difference in the subsidiaries' total book leverage ratio and its predicted leverage ratio and several firm characteristics discussed in Table 5 . Variables are defined in Table 2 . P-values are in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated using White's correction.
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